Five common scenarios of corporate secret leaks

Why are internal risks often more deadly than hacker attacks?

In most companies' information security strategies, preventing external hacker attacks is usually considered the top priority. However, actual security incidents show that what causes long-term, structural damage to enterprises is often not external intruders, but rather personnel from within the organization—including current employees, former employees, and related personnel who have gained access to the system through cooperation.

The risk of internal information leaks is particularly difficult to manage because these leaks mostly occur within the framework of "legitimate access," making them difficult to detect in real time through traditional cybersecurity defense mechanisms. Once critical technology or business information is leaked, the resulting competitive disadvantage and loss of trust often far exceed that of a one-time extortion incident.

The 2025 TSMC advanced process technology leak case in Taiwan's semiconductor industry highlighted the significant impact of internal risks on corporate and industrial security. The incident involved former employees and personnel from the equipment supplier system, who were accused of improperly obtaining highly sensitive information on 2-nanometer process technology, drawing attention at both the judicial and national security levels.

The following are five of the most common and representative scenarios of internal secrets being leaked in enterprises.

1. Deliberate leak: Malicious acts committed under the guise of a legitimate identity.

The most direct source of risk is employees deliberately using their existing privileges to copy, transfer, or carry away core confidential corporate data. This type of behavior often occurs in high-tech, high-value-added positions, such as research and development, manufacturing, product design, or strategic planning units.

Because the behavior itself occurs within the authorized system and appears to be normal operation, it is often difficult to detect early if the company has not implemented behavioral anomaly analysis or data breach protection mechanisms. By the time the problem emerges, the company may have already lost its technological advantage, and the damage may be irreparable.

II. Non-malicious errors: High-risk behaviors in daily operations

Many leaks of classified information did not stem from malicious intent, but rather from unintentional mistakes by employees. Examples include sending documents to the wrong recipient, mistakenly uploading internal data to unauthorized cloud storage, or accessing sensitive information in an insecure network environment.

This type of risk is characterized by high frequency of occurrence and low threshold, but once the data is leaked, it cannot be recovered. If companies rely solely on employee self-discipline but lack institutional safeguards and technical restrictions, they often find it difficult to effectively control the risk.

III. Blurred Data Boundaries in Cooperative Relationships

In a highly specialized and globalized industrial environment, companies must share some information with suppliers, outsourcing partners, and strategic partners. However, if the scope of data authorization, usage restrictions, and oversight mechanisms are not clearly defined, a gray area for the leakage of confidential information may be created.

The TSMC incident involved individuals from both the former employer and the equipment supplier system, reflecting that in industrial cooperation, if roles and data usage boundaries are not clearly defined, even without explicit malice, highly sensitive information may be improperly obtained.

IV. Deficiencies in Internal Control System and Authority Design

Many companies focus on defending against external threats when investing in cybersecurity, but neglect the importance of internal system design. Common problems include overly lenient permission settings, failure to implement the principle of least privilege, or lack of continuous monitoring of data access behavior.

When a system itself has structural loopholes, even if an employee’s behavior appears to be compliant, it may still cause systemic risks and accumulate damage that is difficult to detect over a long period of time.

V. Residual Access Rights After Resignation or Job Change

The failure to promptly remove permissions from departing employees or those whose positions have been adjusted is one of the most frequently overlooked aspects of internal risk management in enterprises. Residual accounts and access permissions can become the starting point for subsequent leaks, and regardless of whether the behavior is malicious, it constitutes a significant management deficiency.

Conclusion: Internal risk is a core issue that enterprises must face squarely.

Compared to hacking attacks, the danger of leaking internal secrets lies in its concealment, persistence, and irreversibility. It not only affects the losses of a single incident, but may also shake a company's long-term competitiveness and even involve industrial and national security.

If enterprises want to truly reduce risks, they must regard cybersecurity as an integrated issue of "people, systems and technology" and establish a complete and implementable internal protection system, from access control, behavior monitoring, data protection to collaborative governance.